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Abstract 
Performance-based contract has developed into a new service strategy in after-market operations that aims to compensate for 
performance outcomes. One of the key components of a performance-based contract is performance measure that is affected by 
factors such as base stock, reliability and response time. To achieve a desired performance level, the supplier has to improve the 
component reliability and the repair time. The component reliability in a repairable part inventory system is a function of the 
number of operational systems and the service capacity.  In this research, we consider a single echelon repairable part inventory 
der 
a performance contract. The results show that the numbers of systems plays a key role on the supplier  response when the 
customer uses the average number of backorders as the negative incentive.  
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1. Introduction 
The profitability of support services, especially for systems with long operational life cycles, encourages 
companies in private and public sectors to pay attention to supportability that is a core performance measure of the 
logistics system. Accordingly, performance based supportability has become an established sustainment strategy that 
aims for the best industry practices implementation in a cost-effective manner [1]. By outsourcing the support 
services, the sustainment contract is being reshaped into a novel approach called performance-based contract (PBC) 
that organizes an agreement between two parties (customer and supplier).  
Investigation of PBC implementation in the defense sector was launched in 1998 when a team of 60, including 
the office of the Secretary of Defense and Logistics Agency, evaluated shifting process from traditional contracts to 
PBC. They set a target of 50% migration to performance-based contracts by the end of 2005 in Army, Air and Navy 
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U.S force [2]. One of the earliest PBC implementation dates back to 1998 when Lockheed Martin offered a system 
to DoD for supporting F-  
Solving intercity traffic problem in Norwegian rail transport is an instance of PBC  successful implementation 
in industry which was launched in 2003 between the Ministry of Transport and Communication (MOT) and the 
Norwegian State Railways (NBS). They designed an incentivized mechanism based on demand and production to 
reach the social goals of the Ministry of Transport while Payment 
was made in accordance with train-kilometre and seat-kilometre output leading to increased service frequency and 
reduced crowding. To capture the risk of ignoring punctuality, NBS was also penalized for train cancellations and 
delays [3].  
To achieve a desired performance outcome, an appropriate incentive should be in place to motivate the supplier. 
In previous studies [4, 5], average number of backorders, average downtime and cumulative downtime have been 
used as three efficient incentives under performance contracts. However, a contract based on these three 
performance measures may cause different responses from the supplier(s) depending on the system features. Also, 
anticipating the supplier  reaction to each incentive mechanism is very important in performance contract as the 
customer may  
In [5] the authors show that when the supplier does not have any control on the system failure rate, using average 
downtime rather than cumulative downtime leads to higher performance. They also found that when the supplier has 
the ability to reduce the system failure rate, cumulative downtime is superior to average downtime. They focused on 
systems with infrequent failure where there are many examples of systems with a high failure rate. To simplify the 
analysis, they also assume a constant failure rate and ignore the dependency of the failure rate to the number of 
operational systems and the service rate. 
In [6] the authors found that to achieve a desired performance level in a repairable parts inventory system, the 
supplier has to improve the component reliability and the repair time, rather than invest in building up a stock of 
spares. The most effective incentive is defined based on the sensitivity of the parameters that can enhance 
performance. The best incentive must have the highest sensitivity to the failure rate and repair rate since it can 
motivate the supplier to improve these parameters.  
The failure rate in a repairable parts inventory system is a function of the number of operational systems and the 
service rate. The number of operational systems, in turn, is directly dependent on the total number of systems which 
should be supported by the supplier. Therefore, the number of systems is one of the main parameters that may affect 
the supplier  response under performance contract. Against this backdrop, the following question becomes 
important in the successful implementation of a performance-based contract: How does the number of systems 
influence the supplier  decision under a performance-based contract?  
In this research, we consider a single echelon repairable part inventory system consisting of a repair facility and 
a single warehouse. We conduct a parametric analysis to evaluate the impact of the total number of systems on the 
supplier  decision under performance contract. The results show that the numbers of systems plays a key role on the 
supplier  response when the customer applies the average number of backorders as the negative incentive.  
To the best of our knowledge, this research is the first attempt to evaluate the role of the total number of systems 
on the effectiveness of incentives under performance contract. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 
2 discusses the relevant literature on performance based contract. In section 3 we present the structure of the 
inventory system. The incentive mechanism is discussed in Section 4. The performance contracting is modelled in 
Section 5 and Section 6 rounds off the paper with conclusions and future research directions.  
2. Literature Review 
After-sales services are, often, contracted between two parties (customer and the supplier) and sometimes 
contractual problems do come up during the contract period. These issues become even more important in 
performance contracts where the customer requires a minimum level of performance and the supplier is rewarded or 
penalized in accordance with the delivered outcome. The literature offers some guidelines on understanding the 
concept of PBC and its fundamental issues by studying real-life implementation of PBC. In [7] the author conducts a 
study to find the most frequent barriers and enablers to effective PBC implementation. His findings indicate that 
enhancing the performance, metric and incentive can lead to successful implementation of a PBC.  
The performance of an inventory system with repairable parts can be defined in different ways. Modelling the 
performance in such systems has been studied extensively in the literature [8, 9]. In [10] the author compares several 
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system performance measures, such as fill rate, ready rate, operational rate and backorder. He concludes that 
backorders are the most reasonable performance measure.  
The literature of performance and metrics in repairable systems strongly suggests using availability as the key 
performance measure for systems under performance-based contracts.  There is a common approach to measuring 
the availability of the system, namely, the average number of backorders. In [4] the authors study a repairable 
inventory model under PBC in which the availability of the system is formulated based on the average number of 
backorders. In this research the failure rate and repair rate have been assumed constant as relaxing these assumptions 
may change the results.    
Keeping the availability of complex technical systems (such as computer networks, defence and medical 
systems) at a certain level is vital since user operations may suffer when the systems fail. In such systems, the failure 
of systems leads to significant losses for the users; if the duration of the backorders is long, the losses may grow 
exponentially. In [11] the authors believe that the availability of the system is specified by its reliability and the 
speed of its repair facility. The speed of system repair activities is improved by the repair-by-replacement approach 
in which a failed part is replaced by a ready-for-use one. 
In [12] the authors evaluate performance-based logistics (PBL) as a way to integrate acquisition and sustainment 
of systems, and leverage commercial best practices to reduce costs, improve performance, and ensure operational 
readiness. Their research also highlights the tracking of performance data to ensure PBL is achieving the expected 
results of reduced costs, improved performance and reliability. In [13] the authors look at outcome-based contracts 
as an excellent evidence of organizations shifting form goods-dominated logic to service-dominated logic. They 
analyse two contracts between defence contractors and the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) that provide 
maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) services to the fighter jet and the missile system for their entire operational 
life. 
Performance-based contracts have been used widely in both commercial and military sector, and quite a few 
articles [4, 5, 6, 11, 14, 15] study design and implementation of PBC. The literature review reveals a lack of 
understanding of how such contracts should be designed and implemented taking into account the number of 
operational systems. Evaluating the impact of the number of systems on the supplier  decision under performance 
contract is the focus of this research. 
3. Inventory System 
We consider a single echelon repairable part inventory system consisting of a repair facility and a single 
warehouse. In this system, the supplier can improve the system performance by managing base stock level at the 
warehouse, component reliability, and efficiency of the repair facility. The system operates under the following 
assumptions: 
 
  
 The demand for each component occurs according to a Poisson process with the variable rate , where z 
is the number of operational systems. 
 The repair time at each server in the repair facility, which consists of the repair time and transportation 
delay, is an independent exponential random variable with mean (μ)-1. 
 A one-for-one base stock (S) replenishment policy is used where a failed component is immediately 
replaced by a ready-to-use component (new or refurbished) from the warehouse and the failed one is sent to 
the repair facility. 
 
In [6] the authors apply Markovian approach for such an inventory system to develop the steady-state probability 
x x). The flow balance equations are: 
 
1 1( ) ( ) ([ ( 1, )] )x x xz D F Min z N for N x S        
                                                                                                                                                                                 (1)       
     
1 1 1 1
0 0
if N x S if N x S
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By solving the balance equations and the normalizing constraint, we can specify x as follows:     
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4. Performance Measure 
Given the steady-state probabilities, the average number of backorders can be computed as follows: 
 
1
,
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                                                        (3) 
 
 
As can be seen, the average number of backorders is a function of the ratio of the failure rate to the service rate. 
Let , so we can calculate the average number of backorders based on S and : 
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To evaluate the impact of the base stock on the average number of backorders, we define the sensitivity 
function of the number of backorders to the base stock as: 
 
( , ) (0, ) ( , ) 0 1B S B B S                                                                                                                  (5) 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the behaviour of  by varying  for different levels of the base stock. 
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Fig 1. The sensitivity of the number of backorders to the base stock 
 
 
As can be seen from Figure 1, adding the base stock decreases the number of backorders only around a special 
value of  ( 1 2), especially when the number of systems is high. Also, we find that this value of  is directly 
related to the number of systems ( ). This means that keeping the base stock can be helpful for the supplier 
only when he chooses a service rate close to the failure rate ( ).  If the supplier sets a service rate much 
smaller than the failure rate ( ) the repair queue increases rapidly and the supplier cannot control the number 
of backorders, even by adding base stock. On the other hand, when the service rate is much larger than the failure 
rate ( ) there is no queue at the repair centre and the supplier does not need to keep any base stock. We can 
simplify the average backorders formula as: 
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                                                              (6) 
 
 
We notice that for each value of the number of systems (N) there is a range of  ( 2 ) in which the value 
of a  is much larger than the value of b , regardless of the base stock level. Therefore, the second term in B is one: 
 
21 1
a for
a b
                                                                                                                                 (7) 
 
We also observe that there is a special range of  ( 1) for each value of the number of systems such that 
the value of a/ (a-b) is almost zero. In that range the repair centre is fast enough to replace the failed part in a short 
time so there is no backorder.   
 
10 0
a for
a b
                                                                                                                                 (8) 
 
 
We conclude that the average number of backorders can be approximated by the following formula: 
 
 
2
1 2
1
1 1
1( )( )
0 0
N
aB N
a b
                                                                                                                        (9) 
 
 
5. Performance Contract 
As a first step in performance-based contract, the customer offers a compensation model which determines the 
payment to the supplier over the lifetime of the contract. The supplier, as the other interested party in the contract, 
sets the parameters of the system (such as inventory level, reliability of components and repair rate) to deliver the 
facility cost. We assume that all cost functions are linear in S and  with unit cost CS , C  respectively. 
 
1( , ) STC S S C C                                                                                                                                        (10) 
 
 
For providing insurance to the supplier, a fixed payment (w) is included in the model. To incentivize the supplier 
to improve the system (increase his performance), both positive and negative incentives are also included in the 
(TC) and penalizes the 
supplier based on the average number of backorders. 
 
( ) ( )P w TC E B                                                                                                                                         (11) 
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w sents a percentage of  and 
denotes the penalty rate for each backorder. Given the contract terms (w,  ), the supplier then sets ( , S) to 
maximize his profit: 
 
 
2
1 1(1 ) ( ) ( )
. 1
SMax w SC C N
S t
                                                                                                   (12) 
 
 
In this range of , the supplier  decision for S and  is as follows: 
 
 
2 (1 )0 ,
1
C
S
Otherwise
                                                                                                                      (13) 
 
 
When 2  the base stock does not affect the number of backorders. Therefore, the supplier keeps no base 
stock due to its associated costs. Also, the supplier has motivation to improve the performance only when the 
penalty rate ( ) is larger than the cost of such improvement ((1-  C
to choose the lowest  in this range ( 2 ).   
As a next step, the supplier evaluates the benefit of choosing a lower  ( 2):   
 
 
1 2
1 1(1 ) ( ) ( )( )1( )
.
S
S
aMax w SC C N
a
N
S t
                                                                                (14) 
 
 
From the experiments, we again observe that the supplier  benefit will be maximum around a special value of  
( ) regardless of the value of base stock (S). To verify this, we show in Table 1 how 1 and 2 converge to this 
value (1/N) as the number of systems is increased.  
 
1 2 vs. the number of systems 
N 1 1/N 2 
50 0.015 0.02 0.025 
100 0.007 0.01 0.012 
500 0.0018 0.002 0.0022 
 
 
Now, we can find the optimal base stock level by setting the optimal  (1/N). The supplier  objective can be 
simplified as follows: 
 
2
(1 ) ( ) ( )1( ) ( 1, )
S
N N
NMax w SC NC
Ne N N SN
N
                                                                    (15) 
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Proposition 1. The optimal base stock (S ) level set by the supplier is  
 
 
* 1( ) ( 1, )
(1 )
N N
S
NS e N N
C N
                                                                                                                 (16) 
 
 
Proof: profit is a concave function of S. Observe that: 
 
 
3 2 4
2
2 3
2(1 ) 01 1[( ) ( 1, ) ] [( ) ( 1, ) ]
S
N N N N
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                           (17) 
 
 
Given that  profit is a concave function with respect to S), we obtain 
 
* 1( ) ( 1, )
(1 )
N N
S
NS e N N
C N
                                                                                                                 (18) 
 
 
As the result, if the customer offers the contract parameters (  ) such that (  > (1-  C ), the supplier chooses (  
S) as follows 
 
 
* *1 1, ( ) ( 1, )
(1 )
N N
S
NS e N N
N C N
                                                                                           (19) 
 
 
From the above formulas for *, S*, we find the following results which offer insights into the impact of the contract 
terms on supplier  optimal decision. 
 
 
* * *(1) (2) / 0 (3) / 0N S S                                                                                                    (20) 
 
 
is  which is 
directly proportional to the number of systems. Parts (2) and (3) show the supplier  reaction to the contract 
parameters (  ). A larger penalty rate ( ) creates a stronger incentive for the supplier to decrease the number of 
backorders by increasing the base stock. Also, increasing the cost sharing rate ( ) by the customer motivates the 
supplier to increase the base stock as the customer reimburses a larger portion of the associated costs.  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
    number of operational units in 
performance-based contracts. Under performance contracts, the customer cannot directly impact 
investment decision. Therefore, customers need to design the contracts in a way that positively motivates the 
suppliers to improve and maintain the system reliability. Also the most effective incentive mechanism is introduced 
based on the sensitivity of the parameters that can improve the performance such as failure and service rates. As the 
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failure rate is a function of the number of operational systems and the service rate, the number of systems is a 
prominent parameter that affects the supplier  response under performance contract. 
We conduct a parametric analysis to evaluate the role of total number of systems on the effectiveness of average 
number of backorders as an incent
directly influenced by the number of systems when the customer applies the average number of backorders as a 
negative incentive. Our findings also highlight the impact of the penalty and cost sharing rates as contract terms 
(from the customer) on the decision of the base stock level by the supplier. Finally, finding the most effective 
incentive mechanism that is affected by system parameters such as the number of operational systems is a direction 
for future research. 
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